The Moral Imperative to Argue

Disagreement is unfashionable and challenging in contemporary society. On many occasions when one’s opinion contradicts someone else’s, one finds hostility, frustration, and anger emerging not only from the objector to one’s opinion, but also from within oneself. Clearly, there is an enormous entanglement between emotions and beliefs, which is hardly a surprise; it has long been thought that many (if not all) beliefs arise from emotions. 

In the face of this, it has become common coin to avoid disagreements altogether, and in many social situations this seems wise. I do not wish to dissent from this from a pragmatic standpoint; I merely wish to establish that when the setting of a conversation conduces to polite, staid discussion, one has a moral responsibility to express disagreements with the positions of others.

To see this, consider the nature of an opinion; generally speaking, to hold either p or not-p as an opinion is to assent or dissent from p, respectively. Thus, what is under consideration in a genuine disagreement is some proposition p, seen as true by one participant and false by another. I specify a genuine disagreement, because one often finds that disagreements result from different understandings of the proposition in question, such that each person is really speaking about a different proposition.

Now, it seems intuitively obvious that it is better to believe something true than something false; or perhaps I ought to say, that it is better to know the truth than not to know it. Indeed, why else would people be offended by the claim that their beliefs are false, if not because they have a strong emotional desire that the beliefs be true? 

Therefore, one has a moral responsibility to promote understanding of the truth on the part of others. Of course, what one is attempting to prove to another may not be true; but insofar as one believes that it is, one ought to attempt to lead others to the same conclusion.

What bearing does this have on Catholicism? Its relationship to theology is twofold. First, it relates to the question of Catholics’ interactions with members of other religions; secondly, the argument for this moral principle, while it may not hold for everyone, does hold for Catholics.

To take the latter point first, it is clear that the unconditional love of others is central to Jesus’ message in the canonical Gospels. How, though, can love be a moral imperative, when love seems to be emotional and thus out of the control of the will? 

The Church has traditionally answered this question by proposing a definition of “love,” viz. to will the good of the other. If this definition is correct (and it seems to be, particularly is one sets great store by Catholic tradition), then, given the apparent fact that it is good to know true things rather than false ones, contained in the moral requirements of loving one’s neighbor is the normative statement, “One ought to lead one’s neighbor to belief in true propositions.”

The question of Catholicism and other religions is far thornier. The importance of emphasizing dialogue rather than conflict has been the trademark of interreligious relationships in the last hundred years, and this is certainly important. 

The violence perpetrated, both historically and to this day, in the name of religion bears witness to the fact that many believers in religions attach much emotional weight to their beliefs, thus rendering them susceptible to irrational and bellicose reactions to any challenge. This can be seen in recent times with e.g. the reactions of many religious fundamentalists to Darwin’s theory of natural selection, which they saw as challenging their religion, and the belligerence and hostility displayed by members of any given religion to members of other religions (some feel threatened by the very existence of a religion other than their own).

However, many conversations regarding religion take place on theological and other intellectual grounds, particularly within academic settings (although intelligent and intellectually inclined religious believers can and do have such conversations outside of such an environment). 

In these conversations, it is still common to focus on dialogue rather than debate; however, this tendency runs afoul of the moral imperative just expressed. Even in these settings, dialogue regarding the possibility of coexistence can and must take place, since it is highly improbable that all believers in one religion will be convinced that their theological opinions are false; however, given the possibility of changing even one person’s mind such that he or she changes from a state of believing a false proposition to believing in its true alternative, there is an equal necessity that intellectual debate concerning certain religious claims take place.

Since the source of this imperative is the moral necessity of genuinely convincing people to believe something true, it is essential that such arguments occur with certain conditions: they must be intellectually rigorous, respectful of legitimate counterarguments, and carried out in such a way as to avoid running afoul of other aspects of the imperative to love one’s neighbor (to attempt to help a person in one way, e.g. helping them come to believe something true, by harming them in another exemplifies a moral calculus in which very few theologians would profess belief, and which is nowhere to be found in Catholic teachings; however, one could apply the doctrine of double effect, if one accepts it, and claim that the harm is foreseen but unintended, the intended end being the interlocutor’s positive change of mind).

One may claim that arguments cannot change someone’s mind, particularly as to matters of belief in a religion. While this claim is subject to a plenitude of objections, let us assume for argument’s sake that it is true. If so, one thing which is certainly the case is that arguments can help a person “on the fence” overcome his or her intellectual difficulties. 

For instance, a defense of the legitimacy of the Gospels as historical documents might help a person who did not believe such a defense was possible overcome an intellectual roadblock, even if his or her ultimate conversion were for more emotional reasons. In other words, even if the availability of arguments in defense of a religious proposition is not a sufficient condition for a change of mind, it is at least necessary for some people; and this is all it takes to get my argument off the ground, for now one can see that to provide such arguments is in some cases necessary to bring about newfound belief in a truth, which is clearly a good thing.